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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICAL MONITORING IN MISSOURI AFTER MEYER ex rel.
COPLIN v. FLUOR CORP.: SOUND POLICY SHOULD BE RESTORED
TO A VAGUE AND UNSOUND DIRECTIVE

MARK A. BEHRENS* AND CHRISTOPHER E. APPEL**

INTRODUCTION
Historically, the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan has been a national
model for selecting a judiciary that is not only independent but also fair and
balanced.1 A recent decision from the Missouri Supreme Court, however, may
cause some to question whether that balance is at risk of being lost in the area
of tort law.2
In Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.,3 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs with no present physical injury may recover medical monitoring
as an item of compensable damages when liability is established under a
traditional tort law theory of recovery. Medical monitoring claims seek to
recover the anticipated costs of long-term diagnostic testing to detect the onset

* Mark A. Behrens is a partner in the Washington, D.C.-based Public Policy Group of Shook,
Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He received his B.A. in Economics from the University of WisconsinMadison in 1987 and his J.D. from Vanderbilt University Law School in 1990, where he was a
member of the Vanderbilt Law Review. The author acknowledges the support of Altria Group,
Inc. in connection with the preparation of this article, however, the views discussed herein are
solely those of the author as a scholar of tort law and from his work as counsel in numerous
amicus briefs filed on behalf of national business organizations in medical monitoring appeals
before state courts of last resort.
** Christopher E. Appel is an attorney in the Washington, D.C.-based Public Policy Group of
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He received a B.S. from the University of Virginia’s McIntire
School of Commerce with a double concentration in Finance and Marketing and an additional
Economics degree from the College in 2003. He received his J.D. from Wake Forest University
School of Law in 2006.
1. See generally Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273 (2002)
(promoting appointive judicial selection systems over state judicial elections).
2. See Donna Walter, Group Releases ‘Judicial Hellholes’ Report for 2007, DAILY REC.
(KANSAS CITY, MO.), Dec. 19, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25185325 (reporting that the
Missouri Supreme Court received a “dishonorable mention” by the American Tort Reform
Foundation in its 2007 list of judicial “hellholes”).
3. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2007).
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of disease from exposure to a toxic substance.4 The Meyer court also held that
the potential harmful exposure at issue, namely, lead emitted from defendant’s
smelting plant—because it came from a single source—was enough to satisfy
the requirements for class certification under Missouri law.5 Meyer has been
listed by one of the nation’s foremost plaintiffs’ class action attorneys as one of
the “top ten” decisions of 2006-2007.6
This Comment will discuss the Meyer opinion in detail and provide
suggestions for lower courts that may be faced with answering the many
questions raised by the court’s vague directive. If serious problems emerge
with respect to the Missouri Supreme Court’s approach, not only will the
court’s historically solid reputation suffer, but the “Missouri Plan” itself may
come under greater attack.7
I. MEYER EX REL. COPLIN V. FLUOR CORP.
A.

The Meyer Opinion

Meyer involved a medical monitoring class action filed by over 200
children allegedly exposed to lead released into the environment by
defendant’s smelter.8 Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages to establish a
medical monitoring program to obtain ongoing diagnostic testing to determine

4. Id. at 716.
5. Id. at 719.
6. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Top Ten Class Action Decisions of 2006-2007, in Civil Practice
and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts (ALI-ABA Course of Study July 11–13,
2007).
7. For recent articles discussing a broader debate that is occurring over the Missouri Plan,
see, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, State’s Judicial Nomination Process Threatened, NAT’L L.J., Aug.
20, 2007, at 6; Former Missouri Supreme Court Justices Defend Court Plan, KAN. CITY STAR,
Aug. 14, 2007, at D11, available at 2007 WLNR 15670101; Bill Graham, Commentary, Missouri
Judiciary Is at Stake, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 15, 2007, at 2, available at 2007 WLNR 15753211;
Scott Lauck et al., And Then There Were 3: Supreme Court Selections Spark New Attacks on
Non-Partisan Plan, MO. LAW. WKLY., July 30, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 14696317;
Scott Lauck, Best-Laid Plan, MO. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 3, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR
17301307; Bill McLellan, Editorial, Nonpartisan Court Plan May Not Be So Nonpartisan, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27, 2007, at C1, available at 2007 WLNR 14429233; Laura Denver
Stith, Address at the Missouri Bar and the Judicial Conference of Missouri Annual Meeting (Sept.
27, 2007), in MO. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 1, 2007, at 8–9, available at 2007 WLNR 22561813; Kelly
Wiese, Missouri Court Plan Reform Sought for ’08 Ballot, DAILY REC. (KANSAS CITY, MO.),
Nov. 13, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 22561313; Virginia Young, Chief Justice Defends
Missouri’s Judge Selection Process, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 2007, at C4, available
at 2007 WLNR 17810551.
8. Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 714.
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whether exposure to lead and other toxins from defendant’s plant had caused
or was in the process of causing an injury or illness.9
As a threshold matter, the court had to determine whether Missouri permits
a medical monitoring action or remedy for plaintiffs with no present physical
injury. For more than 200 years, a fundamental tort law principle has been that
a plaintiff must have a present, actual injury to obtain a recovery.10 At times,
this bright line rule may seem harsh, but courts developed this filter to prevent
a flood of claims, provide faster access to courts for those with reliable and
serious claims, and ensure that defendants are held liable only for objectively
verifiable, genuine harm.11 As explained below, the United States Supreme
Court, most recent state courts of last resort, and numerous other state and
federal courts have rejected medical monitoring claims absent physical injury.
Some courts, however, have permitted a medical monitoring action or remedy
as an exception to the traditional physical injury rule.12
The Meyer court chose to align itself with courts that have permitted
medical monitoring. The court suggested that the “widely recognized tort law
concepts premised upon a present physical injury are ill-equipped to deal with
cases involving latent injury,”13 because “a physical injury requirement
essentially extinguishes the claim and bars the plaintiff from a full recovery.”14
The court held that medical monitoring is “a compensable item of damage
when liability is established under traditional theories of recovery.”15 To
recover medical monitoring damages in Missouri, a plaintiff must show “a
significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what
would be the case in the absence of exposure.”16 Once this baseline
requirement has been proved, the plaintiff must show that “medical monitoring
is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose
properly the warning signs of disease.”17

9. Id.
10. See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 330–33 (4th ed.
1971); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 4 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2007) (“‘Physical harm’ means the physical impairment of the human body. . . .”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. e (1965) (“The words ‘physical harm’ are used to
denote physical impairment of the human body”).
11. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 21.
12. Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3.
13. Id. at 716.
14. Id. at 718.
15. Id. at 717.
16. Id. at 718 (quoting Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 433 (W.Va.
1999)). See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of
Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975, 1980–81 (2002) (providing examples of when absolute or relative
risk may be deemed “significant” enough to support imposition of liability for medical
monitoring costs).
17. Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 718 (quoting Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431).
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Next, the court held that exposure to a set of toxins from a single source
was sufficient to permit class certification. The court said that individual
factors, such as the intensity or duration of exposure, were “not particularly
relevant because the need for monitoring is based on a common threshold of
exposure.”18 In contrast, “the majority of courts that have addressed
certification for medical monitoring claims have rejected class treatment.”19
Finally, a majority of the court rejected the contention of several dissenting
justices that the class should not have been certified because the proposed
representative plaintiff was atypical of the class members.20 The proposed
class representative had filed an individual lawsuit to recover for an actual
injury, not medical monitoring. Thus, the dissenting justices argued, the
proposed representative plaintiff’s claims were not only dissimilar to those of
the class seeking medical monitoring, but actually in conflict.21 The majority
swept these concerns aside, asserting that any such problem could be corrected
on remand through substitution of parties.22
B.

The Meyer Opinion is Out of Step with Recent Medical Monitoring
Decisions

The Meyer court suggested that its decision to discard the traditional
physical injury requirement and allow recovery of medical monitoring
damages by asymptomatic plaintiffs fell within the legal mainstream. The
court said, “tort law has evolved over the years to allow plaintiffs
compensation for medical monitoring.”23 To support its conclusion, the court
relied upon questionable dictum in a Nevada case suggesting that a medical
monitoring remedy may be available in that state, but not deciding the issue
(while actually rejecting medical monitoring as a cause of action);24 a

18. Id. at 719.
19. Beko Reblitz–Richardson, Note, Lockheed Martin and California’s Limits on Class
Treatment for Medical Monitoring Claims, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 625 (2004); see also P.
Campbell & Michelle I. Schaffe, Request for Class Action Certification of Medical Monitoring
Claims, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 26, 27–28 (1996) (“Because medical monitoring claims involve
numerous individualized issues, many courts have found that they cannot efficiently or fairly be
adjudicated on a class action basis.”).
20. Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 719; see also id. at 720–21 (Price, J., dissenting and Russell, J.,
concurring in the dissent); id. at 721 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 720–21 (Price, J., dissenting and Russell, J., concurring in the dissent); id. at
721 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 719–20 (majority opinion).
23. Id. at 716.
24. See id. at 716 n.3 (citing Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001)).
But see Badillo, 16 P.3d at 441 (“[W]e hold that Nevada common law does not recognize a cause
of action for medical monitoring. A remedy of medical monitoring may be available for an
underlying cause of action, but neither party has briefed the issue nor set forth the cause of action
to which it would provide a remedy.”).
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Louisiana case that was subsequently overruled by statute,25 a West Virginia
case that has been criticized;26 a Tennessee case that did not involve medical
monitoring (while failing to note more recent cases predicting that Tennessee
would not allow medical monitoring recoveries by asymptomatic plaintiffs);27
a New Jersey case limited by subsequent decision,28 a Connecticut case
examining a workers’ compensation statute (while failing to note that medical
monitoring was rejected in two subsequent unreported tort cases);29 and
opinions by intermediate appellate courts.30 The court also cited cases decided

25. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.
2d 355 (La. 1998)). Soon after Bourgeois was decided, the legislature “overruled” the court’s
decision and abolished medical monitoring absent physical injury. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2315 (2007).
26. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Bower v. Westinghouse Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424
(W. Va. 1999)). But see Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 434–36 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
27. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639
S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982) (couple could recover mental anguish for ingesting indefinite amount of
a harmful substance)). But see Jones v. Brush Wellman, Inc., No. 1:00 CV 0777, 2000 WL
33727733, at *8 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (unreported) (“It is clear that under Tennessee law, a plaintiff
must allege a present injury or loss to maintain an action in tort. No Tennessee cases support a
cause of action for medical monitoring in the absence of a present injury.”); Bostick v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., No. 03-2626 BV, 2004 WL 3313614, at *14 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2004) (unreported)
(“[A] review of the applicable case law reveals that Tennessee does require a present injury.”).
28. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287,
312 (N.J. 1987)). Ayers was limited by Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993)
(requiring that medical monitoring plaintiffs must prove injury resulting from direct exposure to a
toxic substance); see also Vitanza v. Wyeth, Inc., 2006 WL 462470, at 6–7 (N.J. Super. Jan. 24,
2006) (unpublished) (holding that medical monitoring was derived for environmental tort actions
and is not appropriate in a product liability consumer fraud case). But see Sinclair v. Merck &
Co., Inc., 913 A.2d 832, 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (denying motion to dismiss until
evidential foundation is developed to evaluate plaintiff’s claims in light of Ayers), cert. granted,
921 A.2d 446 (N.J. 2007).
29. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn.
1997)). But see Goodall v. United Illuminating, No. X04CV 950115437S, 1998 WL 914274, at
*10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1998) (unreported) (holding that medical monitoring damages
could not be recovered when plaintiffs demonstrated no physical manifestation of an asbestosrelated disease, distinguishing Doe); Bowerman v. United Illuminating, No. X04CV 94011536S,
1998 WL 910271, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1998) (unreported) (same). Cf. Martin v.
Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313, 323 (D. Conn. 2002) (“The court accepts [plaintiff’s]
representation and does not construe [plaintiff’s] complaint and subsequent pleadings as
requesting medical monitoring based on exposure as the sole injury and cause of action.”).
30. See Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28
(Ariz. App. 1988), review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989); Askey v. Occidental Chem.
Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. 1984)); see also id. at 718 (citing Petito v. A.H. Robins Co.,
750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. App. 1999), review denied, 780 So. 2d 912 and 780 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2001)).
Askey has been followed in New York, see Patton v. General Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666, 674
(W.D.N.Y.1997); Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont de NeMours & Co., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 475, 479
(W.D.N.Y. 1995); Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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prior to the United States Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,31 which rejected medical monitoring for
asymptomatic Federal Employees’ Liability Act (FELA) plaintiffs.32
In Buckley, the Supreme Court ruled 7–2 against allowing negligent
infliction of emotional distress or medical monitoring claims brought by an
asymptomatic pipefitter against his employer for occupational exposure to
asbestos under the FELA, a statute that has often been construed in favor of
plaintiffs.33 The Court concluded that a worker “cannot recover unless, and
until, he manifests symptoms of disease.”34 The Court carefully considered the
policy concerns militating against adoption of a medical monitoring cause of
action, including the difficulty in identifying which medical monitoring costs
are over and above the preventative medicine ordinarily recommended for
everyone, conflicting testimony from medical professionals as to the benefit
and appropriate timing of particular tests or treatments, and each plaintiff’s
unique medical needs.35 The Court appreciated that medical monitoring would
permit literally “tens of millions of individuals” to justify “some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring.”36 The Court also rejected the
argument that medical monitoring awards are not costly and feared that
allowing medical monitoring claims could create double recoveries because

1991), but may be limited. See Abusio v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d
371, 372 (N.Y. App. Div.) (requiring a showing of clinically demonstrable presence of toxins in
the plaintiff’s body or some indication of exposure–related disease to establish “reasonable basis”
for recovery of medical monitoring costs), leave denied, 664 N.Y.S.2d 268 (N.Y. 1997); Jones v.
Utils. Painting Corp., 603 N.Y.S.2d 546, 546–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs
could not recover medical monitoring absent specific allegation of actual exposure to asbestos at
toxic levels given that plaintiffs still in employ of defendant were receiving medical monitoring
under the federal Occupational Safety & Health Act), leave denied, 611 N.Y.S.2d 134 (N.Y.
1999).
31. Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
32. Compare Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 716 n.3 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991);
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v.
Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d
795 (Cal. 1993); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993); Burns, 752
P.2d 28; Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242), with Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Beeber v. Norfolk S. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“If the
defendant’s negligence, however slight, plays any part in producing plaintiff’s injury, the
defendant is liable.”); Pry v. Alton & S. Ry. Co., 598 N.E.2d 484, 499 (Ill. App. 1992) (“[U]nder
FELA . . . [o]nly slight negligence of the defendant needs to be proved . . . .”).
34. See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 427.
35. Id. at 441–42.
36. Id. at 442.
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alternative, collateral sources of monitoring are often available, such as
through employer-provided health insurance plans.37
The Buckley opinion has been highly influential. In accordance with
Buckley, traditional principles of tort law, and sound public policy, most state
courts of last resort recently presented with the issue have rejected medical
monitoring.
For instance, in Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., the Nevada Supreme
Court rejected class actions by smokers and casino workers seeking the
establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring program to aid in the
early diagnosis and treatment of alleged tobacco-related illnesses.38 The court,
describing medical monitoring as “a novel, non-traditional tort and remedy,”39
held that “Nevada common law does not recognize a cause of action for
medical monitoring.”40 In dictum cited by the Meyer court,41 the Nevada
Supreme Court said that a “remedy of medical monitoring may be available for
an underlying cause of action. . . .”42 The Badillo court, however, specifically
declined to consider that issue43 because neither party had briefed it and the
plaintiffs refused to identify the cause of action to which such a remedy would
attach, “even when specifically questioned on this topic.”44
Contrary to the Meyer court’s assumption, it is not entirely clear that
Nevada would recognize a medical monitoring remedy if the issue were
properly presented, or at least not for all causes of action. Before declining to
decide the issue in Badillo, the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that
some pre-Buckley courts had recognized medical monitoring as a remedy45 but
also said that plaintiffs’ “trend analysis [wa]s somewhat overstated”46 and
“would not present a rational basis for th[e] court’s compliance.”47 In addition,
the Badillo court said that “[a]ltering common law rights, creating new causes
of action, and providing new remedies, for wrongs is generally a legislative,

37. See id. at 443 (“[W]here state and federal regulations already provide the relief that a
[medical monitoring] plaintiff seeks, creating a full-blown tort remedy could entail systemic costs
without corresponding benefits” because recovery would be allowed “irrespective of the presence
of a ‘collateral source’ of payment.”).
38. Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001).
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id.
41. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 716 n.3 (2007).
42. Badillo, 16 P.3d at 441.
43. Id. at 440–41.
44. Id. at 440; see also Badillo v. American Tobacco Co., 202 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D. Nev.
2001) (federal court on remand stating, “the Court also concurs with the Nevada Supreme Court
that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a viable cause of action to which medical monitoring
could properly be tied as a remedy. . . .”).
45. Badillo, 16 P.3d at 440 n.3.
46. Id. at 439.
47. Id. at 440.
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not a judicial function.”48 Perhaps tellingly, the research for this Comment
found no reported (or unreported) cases awarding a medical monitoring
remedy under Nevada law in the many years since Badillo.
Later in 2001, the Alabama Supreme Court in Hinton v. Monsanto Co.
considered a medical monitoring claim in the context of a putative class action
brought by asymptomatic plaintiffs allegedly exposed to toxins released into
the environment by the defendant.49 The court began its analysis by stating
that “Alabama has long required a manifest, present injury before a plaintiff
may recover in tort,”50 and that “[n]oted commentators have agreed with this
approach.”51 The court then summarized the complex legal issues raised by
medical monitoring claims, including the impact on other areas of the law that
would be caused by “such a drastic departure from [the] traditional tort law”
physical injury rule.52 The court stated, “To recognize medical monitoring as a
distinct cause of action . . . would require this Court to completely rewrite
Alabama’s tort-law system, a task akin to traveling in uncharted waters,
without the benefit of a seasoned guide.”53 The court said it was “unprepared
to embark on such a voyage.”54
The Hinton court also discussed a number of public policy concerns raised
by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley, such as a potential avalanche
of claims and the unlimited liability exposure for defendants that would flow
from adoption of a medical monitoring action.55 The Hinton court echoed the
Buckley Court’s concern that “a ‘flood’ of less important cases” would drain
the pool of resources available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with
serious, present injury and adversely affect the allocation of scarce medical
resources.56 In addition, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the argument
that medical monitoring awards are not costly, particularly when they are
aggregated in class actions.57 The court concluded:
[W]e find it inappropriate . . . to stand Alabama tort law on its head in an
attempt to alleviate [plaintiffs’] concerns about what might occur in the future.
We believe that Alabama law, as it currently exists, must be applied to balance

48. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
49. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 828 (Ala. 2001).
50. Id. at 829.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 830.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 831 (citing Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424, 441–43 (1997)).
56. Id. (quoting Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442).
57. See id.
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the delicate and competing policy considerations presented here. That law
58
provides no redress for a plaintiff who has no present injury or illness.

In 2002, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a medical monitoring action
and remedy for asymptomatic plaintiffs in Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Laboratories.59 Plaintiff sought the creation of a court-supervised medical
monitoring fund, for herself and as representative for a class of patients, to
detect the possible onset of primary pulmonary hypertension after ingesting the
“Fen-Phen” diet drug combination.60 The court, citing cases dating as far back
as 1925, stated, “This Court has consistently held that a cause of action in tort
requires a present physical injury to the plaintiff.”61 “Taken together,” the
court said, “all of these cases lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff must have
sustained some physical injury before a cause of action can accrue. To find
otherwise would force us to stretch the limits of logic and ignore a long line of
legal precedent.”62
The Wood court recognized that courts in some states had “venture[ed] into
uncharted territory as they create[d] medical monitoring causes of action and
[made] available remedies that [did] not require a showing of present physical
injury.”63 The Kentucky Supreme Court described these courts as “wellintentioned,” but said that allowing recovery for medical screening “may be
creating significant public policy problems.”64 “In the name of sound policy,”
therefore, the court “decline[d] to depart from well-settled principles of tort
law.”65 The court noted that its rejection of prospective medical monitoring
claims (in the absence of present injury) was supported “by both the United
States Supreme Court and a persuasive cadre of authors from academia.”66
For instance, the court noted that the Buckley Court observed that the “tens
of millions of individuals” who have been exposed to substances that might
justify some form of monitoring “could threaten both a ‘flood’ of less
important cases (potentially absorbing resources better left available to those
more seriously harmed)” and create “‘unlimited and unpredictable liability.’”67
The Wood court also observed that scholars such as Professors James
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski, the Reporters for the Restatement Third,
Torts: Products Liability, have weighed the benefits against the potentially
negative effects of medical monitoring remedies and “have made similarly
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 831–32.
Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002).
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853–54.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id. (quoting Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997)).
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convincing arguments against medical monitoring causes of action or damages
in the absence of present injury or illness.”68
For example, courts will inevitably run into problems in determining how to
distribute medical monitoring awards. Lump-sum awards might not actually
be used for medical costs, especially if a recipient has insurance that will cover
such expenses. Monitoring funds to be used by large numbers of people . . .
require court administration and does not guarantee that potential victims
actually get tested. These remedies are economically inefficient, and are of
questionable long term public benefit. Furthermore, defendants do not have an
endless supply of financial resources. Spending large amounts of money to
satisfy medical monitoring judgments, will impair their ability to fully
compensate victims who emerge years later with actual injuries that require
69
immediate attention.

Lastly, the Alabama Supreme Court noted the problem of issue preclusion
as yet “another obvious impasse” for medical monitoring remedies granted in
the absence of present injury.70 The court explained that denying medical
monitoring actually “benefits victims” by alleviating the possibility that a
plaintiff who recovers medical monitoring costs may be unable to bring
another negligence claim and obtain a much larger recovery later if the person
were to develop an actual illness.71
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Michigan declined to recognize medical
monitoring in Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., an action brought by 173 plaintiffs
on behalf of a putative class of thousands seeking the establishment of a courtsupervised program to monitor the class and their representatives for possible
future manifestations of dioxin-related disease caused by release of the
chemical into the flood plain where the plaintiffs and putative class members
lived and worked. 72 The court held that the plaintiffs, who did not suffer from
a present physical harm, could not recover under existing law because
“Michigan law requires an actual injury to person or property as a precondition

68. Id. (citing James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:
Exposure-based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C.
L. REV. 815 (2002)).
69. Id. (citing Henderson & Twerski, supra note 68, at 844).
70. Id. at 858.
71. Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858; see also Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993
S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex. 1999) (“If recovery were allowed in the absence of present disease,
individuals might feel obliged to bring suit for such recovery prophylactically, against the
possibility of future consequences from what is now an inchoate risk.”).
72. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 685–86 (Mich. 2005); see generally
Francine Nesti, Note, Tort Law – Negligence – There Is No Cause of Action for Medical
Monitoring, Based on Negligence, Absent a Physical Injury, Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 701
N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005), 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 55 (2006) (discussing the Michigan
Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring, absent a physical
injury).
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to recovery under a negligence theory.”73 The court explained that the physical
injury requirement “serves a number of important ends” such as reducing the
risks of fraudulent claims and providing courts with a clear standard to
determine which plaintiffs have stated a valid claim, and which plaintiffs have
not.74
The Michigan Supreme Court went on to discuss whether the common law
of negligence should be modified in order to permit plaintiffs’ medical
monitoring claim to proceed. The court concluded that recognition of a
medical monitoring cause of action would “depart[] drastically from [the]
traditional notions of a valid negligence claim” and that “judicial recognition
of plaintiffs’ claim [may] have undesir[ed] effects that neither [the court] nor
the parties can satisfactorily predict.”75
For instance, the Henry court said that adoption of medical monitoring
“would create a potentially limitless pool of plaintiffs” with pre-injury claims
and “could drain resources needed to compensate those with manifest physical
injuries and a more immediate need for medical care.”76 The court said it
shared the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Buckley that judicial
adoption of medical monitoring “may do more harm than good – not only for
Michigan’s economy but also for “other potential plaintiffs who are not before
the court and who depend on a tort system that can distinguish between reliable
and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims
on the other.”77 The Henry court concluded that it would be “unwise, to say
the least, to alter the common law in the manner requested by plaintiffs when it
is unclear what the consequences of such a decision may be and when we have
strong suspicions, shared by the nation’s highest court, that they may be
disastrous.”78 Any such change, the court believed, “ought to be made, if at
all, by the Legislature.”79

73. Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 689.
74. Id. at 691.
75. Id. at 694.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 696 (quoting Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 443–44
(1997)).
78. Id. at 697.
79. Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 686; see also David C. Campbell, Comment, Medical Monitoring:
The Viability of a New Cause of Action in Oregon, 82 OR. L. REV. 529, 547–49 (2003)
(concluding that the “creation of a medical monitoring tort is based largely, if not exclusively, on
public policy considerations” and that the legislature “is better suited than the courts to revise our
tort system by eliminating the physical injury requirement”); D. Scott Aberson, Note, A FiftyState Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take
When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1129 (2006) (urging courts to
reject medical monitoring absent injury and suggesting the issue is best suited for the legislature);
Carey C. Jordan, Note, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas
Plaintiffs?, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 473, 496 (1996) (same).
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More recently, in 2007, Mississippi’s highest court rejected medical
monitoring in Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc.80 just a few months
before Meyer was decided. In Paz, class action plaintiffs sought the
establishment of a medical monitoring fund for detection of disease
development from beryllium exposure.81 The court said, “There is no tort
cause of action in Mississippi without some identifiable injury, either physical
or emotional.”82 Therefore, “it would be contrary to current Mississippi law to
recognize a claim for medical monitoring costs for mere exposure to a harmful
substance without proof of current physical or emotional injury from that
exposure.”83 The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court
concluded in Buckley that “to recognize medical monitoring alone as a separate
injury is to go ‘beyond the bounds of currently evolving common law.’”84
“Accordingly,” the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded, “as plaintiffs invite
this Court to recognize a medical monitoring cause of action, an act which
would require an unprecedented and unfounded departure from the longstanding traditional elements of a tort action, this Court declines that
invitation.”85
Many other state and federal courts have come to the same conclusion.86
80. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 5–6.
84. Id. at 6 (quoting Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439
(1997)).
85. Id.
86. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim for
credit monitoring after finding no Indiana authority allowing medical monitoring in tort context);
Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 963 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that Nebraska law has not
recognized a medical monitoring action or remedy and predicting that Nebraska courts would not
judicially adopt such a right or remedy), abrogated on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Ball v. Joy Tech., Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir.
1991) (dismissing claim for medical monitoring damages because Virginia law requires a present,
physical injury prior to recovery for negligence), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992); Norwood v.
Raytheon Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (granting motion to dismiss medical
monitoring claims and predicting that “it appears likely that the Texas Supreme Court would
follow the recent trend of rejecting medical monitoring as a cause of action”); Parker v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“[N]o Georgia court has ever
indicated an inclination to recognize such a remedy.”); Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 227 F.R.D.
505, 518 (D.N.D. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff [in North Dakota] would be required to demonstrate a
legally cognizable injury to recover any type of damages in a newly recognized tort, including a
medical monitoring claim.”); Bostick v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 03-2626 BV, 2004 WL 3313614,
at *14 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2004) (unreported) (“[A] review of the applicable case law reveals
that Tennessee does require a present injury.”); Rosmer v. Pfizer, No. CIV.A. 9:99-2280-18RB,
2001 WL 34010613, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (unreported) (noting that South Carolina has
not recognized such a claim); Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 606 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (anticipating that Washington courts would not recognize a cause of action for
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Quite remarkably, the Meyer court took no effort to address, or even
discuss, the serious concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court and
the many recent state courts of last resort that have rejected medical
monitoring for pre-injury plaintiffs. In fact, the Buckley,87 Hinton, 88 Wood, 89
Henry,90 and Paz 91 cases are not mentioned anywhere in the opinion.
The Meyer court apparently failed to consider that allowing a medical
monitoring remedy absent physical injury may lead to a flood of claims,
because “we may all have reasonable grounds to allege that some negligent
business exposed us to hazardous substances. . . .”92 Almost everyone comes
into contact with a potentially limitless number of materials that could be
argued to warrant medical monitoring relief.93 Plaintiffs’ lawyers could

medical monitoring because Washington law requires existing injury in order to pursue a
negligence claim); Jones v. Brush Wellman, Inc., No. 1:00 CV 0777, 2000 WL 33727733, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 13 2000) (unreported) (“It is clear that under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must
allege a present injury or loss to maintain an action in tort. No Tennessee cases support a cause
of action for medical monitoring in the absence of a present injury.”); Thompson v. American
Tobacco Co., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 544, 552 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Given the novelty of the tort of
medical monitoring and that the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to recognize it as an
independent theory of recovery, this Court is not inclined at this time to find that such a tort exists
under Minnesota law.”); Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *87
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (unreported) (refusing to allow medical monitoring claim in absence of
clear direction of the North Carolina legislature, and noting that even if North Carolina courts
recognized medical monitoring, they would require a present physical injury); Purjet v. Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corp., Civ. No. 1985/284, 1986 WL 1200, at *4 (D.V.I. Jan 08, 1986) (rejecting
medical monitoring claim absent physical injury under Virgin Islands law); Mergenthaler v.
Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984) (a claim for medically-required
surveillance expenses is not maintainable in the absence of a present, physical injury); Johnson v.
Abbott Labs., No. 06C01-0203-PL-89, 06C01-0206-CT-243, 2004 WL 3245947, at *6 (Ind. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 31, 2004) (unreported) (“Indiana does not recognize medical monitoring as a cause of
action.”); Bowerman v. United Illuminating, No. X04CV 940115436S, 1998 WL 910271, at *10
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1998) (unreported); Goodall v. United Illuminating, No. X04cv
950115437S, 1998 WL 914274, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15 1998) (unreported); cf. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2007).
87. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
88. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
89. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002).
90. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005).
91. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007).
92. Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring:
Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 130 (1995). “Some 40 million persons—
nearly 20 percent of the U.S. population—live within four miles of a hazardous waste site on the
EPA's National Priority List, and eight out of ten Americans live near some type of hazardous
waste site.” Paul J. Komyatte, Medical Monitoring Damages: An Evolution of Environmental
Tort Law, 23 COLO. LAW. 1533, 1533 (1994).
93. See Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs
or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521 (2000).
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basically begin recruiting people off the street to serve as plaintiffs.94 The
practical effect would be to facilitate recoveries for individuals who have no
injury and may never become sick at the expense of the sick and dying and
their families.95
The asbestos litigation environment vividly illustrates this problem. “By
all accounts, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in recent years have
been on behalf of plaintiffs who . . . are completely asymptomatic.”96 Mass
filings by the non-sick have pushed an estimated eighty-five employers into
bankruptcy and threaten payments to the sick.97 For example, the Manville
trustees reported that a “disproportionate amount of Trust settlement dollars
have gone to the least injured claimants—many with no discernible asbestosrelated physical impairment whatsoever.”98 The Trust is now paying out five
cents on the dollar to asbestos claimants.99 Other asbestos-related bankruptcy
trusts, such as the Celotex and Eagle-Picher Settlement Trusts, have also cut
payments to claimants.100 In fact, lawyers who primarily represent cancer
victims have been highly critical of mass filings by the unimpaired, because
these claims drain resources needed to compensate their sick clients.101
94. See Victor E. Schwartz, Some Lawyers Ask, Why Wait for Injury? Sue Now!, USA
TODAY, July 5, 1999, at A17.
95. See Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (“There must be a
realization that such defendants’ pockets or bank accounts do not contain infinite resources.
Allowing today’s generation of exposed but uninjured plaintiffs to recover may lead to
tomorrow’s generation of exposed and injured plaintiff’s [sic] being remediless.”), aff’d, 958 F.2d
36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
96. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 68, at 823; see also Alex Berenson, A Surge in
Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at A15; Roger Parloff,
Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at 186, available at 2004 WLNR
17888598 (“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this area,
two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’--that is, they have slight or no physical
symptoms.”).
97. Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss, ABA J., Sept. 2006, at 26, 29; Mark A.
Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious
Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts
Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001).
98. Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets Are Reduced as the Medically
Unimpaired File Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6, available at 2001 WLNR 2021170.
99. Id.
100. See Mark Goodman et al., Editorial, Plaintiffs’ Bar Now Opposes Unimpaired Asbestos
Suits, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B14.; James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 223, 262 (2006).
101. See e.g., Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Steven Kazan).
The current asbestos litigation system is a tragedy for our clients. We see people every
day who are very seriously ill. Many have only a few months to live. It used to be that I
could tell a man dying of mesothelioma that I could make sure that his family would be
taken care of. That statement was worth a lot to my clients, and it was true. Today, I
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In addition, a medical monitoring action or remedy would be likely to
create high, ongoing costs for Missouri courts.102 For instance, devising a
sound medical monitoring plan would require, at a minimum, specifying the
nature and amount of benefits available, the source of funding and funding
allotments, the procedures for determining eligibility for monitoring, the
payment mechanism for the provider and the percentage of provider
reimbursement, when eligible parties may join the program, the length of time
the program should last, the frequency of any periodic monitoring and the
circumstances in which the frequency can be changed to allow special
monitoring, the content of the monitoring exams, whether the facility testing
will be formal or informal, and whether the service provider is to be designated
by the court or chosen by the claimant.103 Furthermore, as a medical
monitoring program matures, its scope and administrative operation will
inevitably require adjustments, particularly if the program’s designers
erroneously estimate funding needs or the number of eligible participants.
Administrative intricacies compound in the instance of medical monitoring
class actions, where courts would have to manage each class member’s
monitoring program, a task that “places additional strains on courts that should
be hesitant to undertake such a costly and time-consuming responsibility.”104

often cannot say that any more. And the reason is that other plaintiffs’ attorneys are filing
tens of thousands of claims every year for people who have absolutely nothing wrong
with them.
Id.; Matthew Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on Asbestos Lawsuits,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 2002, at B7, available at 2002 WLNR 2149929
(“Victims of mesothelioma, the most deadly form of asbestos-related illness, suffer the most from
the current system. . . . [T]he genuinely sick and dying are often deprived of adequate
compensation as more and more funds are diverted into settlements of the non-impaired
claims.”); Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics; Mass Medical Screenings, Run by
Lawyers, Reel in Many Who Don’t Feel Ill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 9, 2003, at A1,
available at 2003 WLNR 16115293 (quoting Andrew O’Brien of St. Louis: “There is a limited
amount of money available to properly compensate people who are really sick from asbestos
disease.” He added that consideration should be given to “the needs of those who are seriously
ill” by not “flooding the courts with those who are not sick today and may never become
impaired to the point they can’t lead a normal life.”); Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As
Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest See Payouts Shrink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A1, abstract
available at 2002 WLNR 2320384 (quoting Peter Kraus of Dallas: plaintiffs’ lawyers who file
suits on behalf of the non-sick are “sucking the money away from the truly impaired.”).
102. See Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 698–99 (Mich. 2005) (“[T]he day to day
operation of a medical monitoring program would necessarily impose huge clerical burdens on a
court system, lacking the resources to effectively administer such a regime.”).
103. See Jesse R. Lee, Medical Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the Administration
of Medical Monitoring Programs, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 267–72 (1994).
104. Laurel J. Harbour & Angela Splittgerber, Making the Case Against Medical Monitoring:
Has the Shine Faded on this Trend?, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 315, 320 (2003).
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Other issues raised by medical monitoring programs include the likelihood
that monitoring will detect the existence of disease and the adverse
consequences that false positives may bring;105 the health risks posed by the
proposed tests;106 the effect of such awards on job growth and the economy;107
the likelihood that such plans would overlap with third-party health insurance
plans and entail systemic costs without corresponding benefits; whether
medical monitoring claims in the workplace setting would fall outside of the
workers’ compensation system, which could subject employers to endless
liability; and issues with regard to the availability of commercial general
liability coverage that may require a present bodily injury.
The Meyer court apparently failed to consider any of these potential
negative impacts. Instead, the court aligned itself with the two post-Buckley
state supreme court decisions that adopted medical monitoring—and that have
turned out to be highly problematic: Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.108
and Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc.109
In Bower,110 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia established
an independent cause of action for individual recovery of future medical
monitoring costs absent physical injury. The plaintiffs, who had no present
symptoms of any disease, alleged they were exposed to thirty toxic substances
as a result of defendants maintaining a pile of debris from the manufacture of
light bulbs.111 The court “reject[ed] the contention that a claim for future
medical expenses must rest upon the existence of present physical harm.”112
The court defined the elements necessary to sustain a medical monitoring

105. The risks of medical monitoring include “[f]alse positives [that] can devastate patients
and their families.” Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the
Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 357 (2005) [hereinafter Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring:
The Right Way]; see also Edward F. Patz, Jr., Editorial, Lung Cancer Screening, Overdiagnosis
Bias, and Reevaluation of the Mayo Lung Project, 98 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 724, 724–25 (June
7, 2006) (noting problem of overdiagnosis bias in lung cancer screening and stating that, despite
the substantial resources spent in screening for lung cancer, “none of these studies have shown a
reduction in lung cancer mortality”—“the overall goal of a screening program.”).
106. See Steven Sternberg, Study: Unnecessary CT Scans Exposing Patients to Excessive
Radiation, USA TODAY, Nov. 28, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
health/2007-11-28-dangerous-scans_N.htm (“Overuse of diagnostic CT scans may cause as many
as 3 million excess cancers in the USA over the next two to three decades,” according to a study
in the New England Journal of Medicine).
107. Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 696.
108. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
109. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998).
110. See Bower, 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
111. See id. at 426–27.
112. Id. at 430.
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claim,113 but said that medical monitoring can be awarded even if the amount
of exposure to a toxic substance does not correlate with a level sufficient to
cause injury114 or if there is no effective treatment available for the disease.115
Instead, “[a]ll that must be demonstrated is that the plaintiff has a significantly
increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what would be the
case in the absence of exposure.”116 The court’s criteria state that this
“significantly increased risk” must make it “reasonably necessary” to undergo
medical monitoring that could allow early detection of the disease.117 The
court explained, however, that “factors such as financial cost and the frequency
of testing need not necessarily be given significant weight” in determining the
reasonableness of a proposed monitoring program.118 The court’s ruling also
allows for medical monitoring based on “the subjective desires of a plaintiff
for information concerning the state of his or her health.”119 Finally, the Bower
court rejected the argument that any funds awarded should be awarded in a
court-administered fund and instead awarded funds to plaintiffs in a lump
sum.120 In other words, West Virginia permits uninjured plaintiffs to sue for
medical monitoring even when testing is not medically necessary or beneficial,
and does not require plaintiffs to spend any of the award on actual monitoring.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Maynard argued that the majority’s
decision to engage in judicial lawmaking violated the constitutional separation
of powers by “usurping the Legislature’s authority to enact laws.”121 He also
criticized the majority for rejecting the 200-year-old “physical injury rule” in
favor of a “speculative and amorphous showing of ‘increased risk.’”122 Justice
113. Bower permits a plaintiff to recover medical monitoring expenses under West Virginia
law if: “(1) he or she has, relative to the general population, been significantly exposed; (2) to a
proven hazardous substance; (3) through the tortious conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate
result of the exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contracting a serious latent
disease; (5) the increased risk of disease makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to undergo
periodic diagnostic medical examinations different from what would be prescribed in the absence
of the exposure; and (6) monitoring procedures exist that make the early detection of a disease
possible.” Id. at 432–33.
114. See id. at 433 ([T]he plaintiff is not required to show that a particular disease is certain or
even likely to occur as a result of exposure.”).
115. See id. at 433–34 ([A] plaintiff should not be required to show that a treatment currently
exists for the disease that is the subject of medical monitoring.”).
116. Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433. The court said that “no particular level of quantification is
necessary to satisfy the [‘increased risk’] requirement. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.; see also Shannon L. Smith Wolfe, Note, The Recovery of Medical Monitoring
Costs: An Argument for the Fund Mechanism in the Wake of Bower v. Westinghouse, 103 W. VA.
L. REV. 103 (2000).
121. Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 435 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
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Maynard concluded that the majority’s decision was “bad law”123 because it
would lead to a stampede of new claims:
[The] practical effect of this decision is to make almost every West Virginian a
potential plaintiff in a medical monitoring cause of action. Those who work in
heavy industries such as coal, gas, timber, steel, and chemicals as well as those
who work in older office buildings, or handle ink in newspaper offices, or
launder the linens in hotels have, no doubt, come into contact with hazardous
substances. Now all of these people may be able to collect money as
124
victorious plaintiff without any showing of injury at all.

Bower has fueled medical monitoring litigation in West Virginia125 and is a
primary reason the courts in West Virginia are considered unfair and
imbalanced.126 The respected torts scholars who served as the Reporters for
the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability have criticized Bower’s
“superlative”-riddled criteria.127 They note that Bower’s criteria “will not
prevent most well-prepared cases from reaching triers of fact. There is no
escaping the conclusion that defendants in these medical monitoring cases face
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Gregory C. Read, Medical Monitoring: The New Gold Rush, 68 DEF.
COUNS. J. 141, 141 (2001) (“Almost anyone is a potential plaintiff in a medical monitoring
case.”).
125. See, e.g., Stern v. Chemtall, Inc., 617 S.E.2d 876, 887 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J.,
concurring) (involving asymptomatic coal preparation plant workers: “we have dumped an
additional pile of medical monitoring cases into the circuit judge’s lap.”); In re Tobacco Litig.
(Medical Monitoring Cases), 600 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 2004) (affirming verdict denying medical
monitoring claim in class involving some 270,000 present and former West Virginia smokers); In
re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 2003) (medical monitoring class of
approximately 5,000 users of prescription drug); State ex rel. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v.
Hill, 591 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 2003) (blood tests to approximately 50,000 individuals possibly
exposed to material used to make fluoropolymers). Not all of these suits have been successful,
however, the parties were forced to incur substantial litigation costs.
126. See Robert D. Mauk, Editorial, McGraw Ruling Harms State’s Reputation in Law,
Medical Monitoring, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (WV), Mar. 1, 2003, at 5A,
available at 2003 WLNR 1597810 (“[T]he Bower medical-monitoring ruling has cast a shadow
over our state’s reputation in the legal field. It affects West Virginia’s jobs, taxes, health care and
the public credibility of our courts.”); Robert D. Mauk, Editorial, No Common Sense, W.Va.
Picking Up Tab for Out-of-State Suits, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (WV), Dec. 12,
2001, at 5A, available at 2001 WLNR 708939 (“We are famous for ‘No proof? No problem’
medical monitoring lawsuits, which negatively impact many of our large employers, as well as a
small business, a local town, and West Virginia University.”); John R. Thomas, Editorial,
Lawsuits are Hazardous to Health, West Virginians Pay a High Price in Access to Care,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (WV), Sept. 30, 2002, at 4A, available at 2002 WLNR
1045754 (“We see more and more medical monitoring suits based on the [Bower] rule that people
should be able to sue even when they have no proof of injury. * * * We see lawsuit advertising in
newspapers and on TV, saying things like, ‘You may be able to obtain a cash recovery, even if
you aren’t sick.’”).
127. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 68, at 845.
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potentially crushing liabilities.”128 The Bower ruling also contributed to West
Virginia being named the only statewide “Judicial Hellhole” by the American
Tort Reform Association for several years running.129 A recent U.S. Chamber
of Commerce State Liability System Ranking Study put West Virginia at the
very bottom of all states for creating a fair and reasonable litigation
environment.130
In Bourgeois,131 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided whether
asymptomatic plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos and claimed the need
for regular medical examinations to detect the onset of possible latent diseases
had suffered “damage” as defined by the Louisiana Civil Code.132 The court
acknowledged that traditional tort law awarded medical expenses only when
there was a corresponding physical injury.133 The reasoning for the traditional
rule, according to the Bourgeois court, was the danger of bringing about an
“atmosphere of unlimited and unpredictable liability.”134 Nevertheless, the
court decided that medical monitoring is a compensable item of damage under
Louisiana’s statutory code, provided that a plaintiff can satisfy certain criteria
developed by the court.135 In recognizing medical monitoring as a form of
damages, the court made special note that it was not creating a new cause of
action. Under the Bourgeois standard, a plaintiff must still establish liability
under a traditional tort theory of recovery, such as negligence, strict liability, or
a similar theory.136 The court also highlighted the distinction between a

128. Id. at 845.
129. See Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes 5 (2006), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
130. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2007 State Liability Systems Ranking Study: Final
Report 15 (Harris Interactive, Inc. Apr. 16, 2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.org/lawsuitclimate2007/index.cfm.
131. See Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998); see generally D.
Clayron Cambre, Note, Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc.: Medical Monitoring Expenses
Recoverable in Louisiana, 45 LOY. L. REV. 193 (1999).
132. See Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 357.
133. See id. at 358.
134. Id.
135. The Bourgeois court identified the following criteria: (1) significant exposure to a
proven hazardous substance; (2) as a proximate result of this exposure, plaintiff suffers a
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) plaintiff’s risk of
contracting a serious latent disease is greater than (a) the risk of contracting the same disease had
he or she not been exposed and (b) the chances of members of the public at large of developing
the disease; (4) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the disease
possible; (5) the monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a qualified physician and is
reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific principles; (6) the prescribed
monitoring regime is different from that normally recommended in the absence of exposure; and
(7) there is some demonstrated value in the early detection and diagnosis of the disease. See id. at
360–61.
136. See id. at 361.
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medical monitoring fund and a lump-sum award, noting that it was not offering
an opinion concerning whether lump-sum damages are recoverable under
Louisiana law.137
Significantly, the Bourgeois court expressed “confiden[ce]” that its holding
would “not create an atmosphere of unlimited and unpredictable liability.”138
Almost immediately, however, the court’s decision spurred litigation.139
Consequently, the Louisiana legislature acted swiftly to “overrule” Bourgeois
by amending the statutory law to exclude medical monitoring as a recoverable
item of damages unless the claim is “directly related to a manifest physical or
mental injury or disease.”140
C. Reasonable Parameters to Meyer
The Missouri Supreme Court also declined to establish any parameters for
medical monitoring, leaving litigants and lower courts unguided to find their
way in the tangle of medical, scientific, and policy issues involved in
implementing the court’s vague directive.141 Below are some parameters that
the Missouri Supreme Court or lower courts may wish to consider to restore
some degree of reasonableness to the Meyer opinion.
1. Lump-Sum Awards Should Not be Permitted
If medical monitoring is to be awarded, it should not be made in a lumpsum payment. Otherwise, “there is no assurance that the award, however

137. See id. at 362 n.16.
138. Id. at 362.
139. See, e.g., Dragon v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc., 726 So. 2d 1006 (La. App.
1999) (medical monitoring class action by seamen exposed to asbestos); Scott v. American
Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 1998) (medical monitoring class of Louisiana cigarette
smokers), writ denied, 731 So. 2d 189 (La. 1999); Johnson v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 790 So. 2d
734 (La. App. 2001) (medical monitoring class arising from plaintiffs’ exposure to contaminated
soils), writ denied, 801 So. 2d 378 (La. 2001); cf. Lilley v. Board of Sup’rs of La. State Univ.,
735 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 1999) (rejecting medical monitoring claim by firefighters exposed to
asbestos because minimal increase in the risk of disease was insufficient to satisfy the test set
forth in Bourgeois), writ denied, 744 So. 2d 629 (La. 1999).
140. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315 (2007). The law applies to all causes of action
accruing on or after July 9, 1999. See Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1251 (La.
2001).
141. See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 n.7 (Mo. 2007) (“In this
appeal of a class action decision, which is a procedural matter, there is no need for this Court to
establish precisely what must be proven in order to recover medical monitoring damages.”).
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large, will be used to help a person detect the onset of treatable disease.”142
“[T]he potential for abuse is apparent.”143
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Ayers v. Township of
Jackson144 illustrates the fact that medical monitoring awards often may not
lead to any medical monitoring. In Ayers, 339 plaintiffs, all without present
physical injury, were each awarded over $8 million as a lump-sum for medical
monitoring.145 One author conducted an informal survey of some plaintiffs
after the lawsuit: one plaintiff noted that he used his recovery to buy a home
and that after receiving his award, he had not seen his doctor any more than in
prior years. The two other respondents, who could not even remember if the
damages they received were for medical monitoring, reported they did not see
their doctors more frequently as a result of the award.146
Similarly, in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,147 workers sought
medical monitoring because of asbestos exposure. Nearly seven years after
learning of their exposure, the plaintiffs participated in only preliminary
examinations revealing no asbestos-related illness. Other than the preliminary
tests, the plaintiffs underwent no further testing. One commentator remarked,
“[t]he fact that none had undergone testing over a period of almost seven years
casts grave suspicion over their assertions that they would use any medical
monitoring sums awarded for their stated purpose.”148
In Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Aircraft Corp.,149 the
defendant’s airplane was used in a rescue mission to evacuate Vietnamese
children from Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War.150 Tragically, the plane
crashed mid-flight due to the decompression of the interior compartment.151
Friends for All Children, the legal guardian for the surviving children, sought
compensation from Lockheed for diagnostic examinations to determine if the
decompression or the crash itself caused residual brain dysfunction syndrome
in the children.152 A partial settlement was reached early in the case, in which
the defendant provided $5,000 to each of the infants’ guardians ad litem. The
142. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1077–78 (1999).
143. George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical
Monitoring Remedy In Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 283 (1993) [hereinafter
McCarter].
144. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
145. See id. at 291.
146. See McCarter, supra note 143, at 257 n.158.
147. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
148. Maskin et al., supra note 93, at 541–42.
149. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 819.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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funds could be used either for the childrens’ medical treatment or for their
litigation expenses.153 All of the money was used for litigation expenses.154
These examples show that medical monitoring awards may not result in
plaintiffs actually being monitored. As one group of commentators noted:
The incentive for healthy plaintiffs to carefully hoard their award, and
faithfully spend it on periodic medical examinations to detect an illness they
will in all likelihood never contract, seems negligible. The far more enticing
alternative, in most cases, will be to put the money towards a new home, car or
155
vacation.

If medical monitoring is to be permitted at all, it should be done through a
court-administered fund rather than in a lump-sum award. Distribution of
resources in this manner would reduce the potential for abuse and ensure that
the goal of the award is met.156
2. Eliminate Double Recoveries
The rationale for awarding medical monitoring costs “assumes that
plaintiffs do indeed incur the expenses associated with medical monitoring.”157
In many instances, however, there may be little need for court-awarded
medical monitoring because other established sources of payment exist to
cover these costs, such as employer-provided health plans.158 Commentators
have explained, “medical monitoring may be an entirely redundant remedy for
those who already have health insurance.”159 The United States Supreme
Court also observed in Buckley that a medical monitoring recovery

153. See id. at 820.
154. See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic
Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 285, 307 n.150 (1994).
155. McCarter, supra note 143, at 283.
156. See Abraham, supra note 16, at 1987 (“If the plaintiffs are permitted to use damages paid
to them for medical monitoring costs in order to pay college tuition or take a vacation, the very
purpose behind the imposition of liability is defeated.”); see also Amy B. Blumenberg, Note,
Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in
Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 693 (1992) (“Lump sum awards can result in
windfalls for tort victims and their survivors” and explaining that an advantage of periodic
payments “is that they provide a plaintiff with an opportunity for federal income tax savings,
which does not exist with a lump sum award.”).
157. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way, supra note 105, at 384 (quoting
Maskin et al., supra note 93, at 526).
158. See AM. LAW INST., 2 ENTER. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERS. INJURY—REPORTERS’ STUDY
379 (1991) (stating that approximately 80% of all standard medical testing is paid for by third
party insurance).
159. Maskin et al., supra note 93, at 528; see also John J. Weinholtz, Defending “No
Injury . . . Yet” Medical Monitoring Claims in Class Action Settings, 30-SPG BRIEF 17 (2001)
(Westlaw) (medical monitoring “assumes that plaintiffs would otherwise have to pay such costs
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[W]ould ignore the presence of existing alternative sources of payment,
thereby leaving a court uncertain about how much of the potentially large
recoveries would pay for otherwise unavailable medical testing and how much
would accrue to plaintiffs for whom employers or other sources (say, insurance
160
now or in the future) might provide monitoring in any event.

Medical monitoring should not be available if it would be duplicative of a
benefit the plaintiff is receiving or is eligible to receive from another source.
For example, in Friends for All Children,161 the court took steps to prevent
redundant testing. The court required a doctor’s review of what tests a child
had already undergone before allowing more tests, in an attempt to eliminate
unnecessary duplication.162 Importantly, the court ensured its decision avoided
double recovery by limiting medical monitoring relief to the children adopted
in countries that did not have public health systems that would pay for the
children’s medical examinations.163
3. Other Parameters for Courts Applying Meyer
The Meyer court left open other issues that can be clarified in the future.
These issues include more specific criteria as to when medical monitoring is
“necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”164
First, a plaintiff should be required to prove that a “monitoring procedure
exists that makes the early detection of the disease possible.”165 “If no such
test exists, then periodic monitoring is of no assistance and the cost of such
monitoring [should not be] recoverable.”166
Second, a plaintiff should be required to show that “administration of the
diagnostic test is medically advisable for him or her specifically” and that the
“testing is of a type that a reasonable physician in the area of specialty would
order to a similarly situated patient.”167 “This dual requirement prevents

out of their own pockets, ignoring the real likelihood that most medical tests would be covered by
some form of insurance.”).
160. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
161. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
162. See id. at 835 n.34.
163. See id. at 822 n.7 (allowing recovery only for the French plaintiffs).
164. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. 2007) (quoting Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999)).
165. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. 716 So. 2d 355, 361 (La. 1998).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 980 (Utah 1993);
Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way, supra note 105, at 104 (“According to
prevailing medical thought, medical monitoring tests must be tailored to specific diseases and to
specific individuals.”).
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recovery for costs of treatment not generally accepted by the medical
community.”168
Third, a plaintiff should be required to demonstrate “that his or her
increased risk of disease warrants medical monitoring beyond that which an
individual should pursue as a matter of general good sense and foresight.”169
“[T]here should be no recovery for preventative medical care and checkups to
which members of the public at large should prudently submit.”170
Fourth, there should be some demonstrated clinical value in the early
detection and diagnosis of the disease.171 As the Meyer court explained,
medical monitoring damages “compensate the plaintiff for the quantifiable
costs of periodic medical examinations reasonably necessary for the early
detection and treatment of latent injuries. . . .”172 Unless a treatment is
available, “then there is nothing for the plaintiff to gain from a hastened
diagnosis” and such testing should not be recoverable.173 “[T]he majority of
doctors and scientists believe medical monitoring programs, which generally
pose some degree of risk to the patient, must have the potential to be effective.
They believe medical monitoring is only appropriate when it could lead to the
cure or prevention of disease.”174 Examples of untreatable and incurable
diseases that are not appropriate for medical monitoring include mesothelioma,
multiple sclerosis, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.175
Fifth, the disease development sought to be monitored should be
“serious.”176 Medial monitoring should not be permitted to detect trivial or
nonimpairing conditions.177
168. Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 361.
169. Id.; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 825 (Cal. 1993).
170. Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 361. Professor Andrew Klein has argued that “a plaintiff
ordinarily should recover medical monitoring damages only when she proves that the exposure
more than doubled her enhanced risk of disease.” Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical
Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38 (1998). In other situations, he argues, “tort law is not the
appropriate place for medical monitoring recovery.” Id. at 38.
171. See Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure
Cases: Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 REV. LITIG. 551, 563 (1998) (“If early detection
makes no difference on whether a disease can be treated, or if there is no available method of
disease detection or treatment, then a medical monitoring fund would serve no purpose.”).
172. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Mo. 2007) (emphasis added).
173. Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 361; see also Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d
424, 433 (W. Va. 1999).
174. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way, supra note 105, at 350–51 (citing
Myrton F. Beeler & Robert Sappenfield, Medical Monitoring: What Is it, How Can it Be
Improved?, 87 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 285, 286 (Myrton F. Beeler et al., eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Beeler & Sappenfield]).
175. See id. at 354 (citing W.K.C. Morgan, Medical Monitoring with Particular Attention to
Screening for Lung Cancer, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 157, 157 (J. Bernard L. Gee et al.,
eds., 1984)).
176. Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

MEDICAL MONITORING IN MISSOURI

159

Sixth, courts should utilize a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
medical monitoring is appropriate.178 “Many doctors and scientists caution,
‘[i]t is important that courts resist efforts to extend injury surveillance to
circumstances in which it does not serve health promotion goals in a costeffective manner.’”179 The Utah Supreme Court also explained in Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,180
[I]f a reasonable physician would not prescribe [medical monitoring] for a
particular plaintiff because the benefits of monitoring would be outweighed by
the costs, which may include, among other things, the burdensome frequency
of the monitoring procedure, its excessive price, or its risk of harm to the
181
patient, then recovery would not be allowed.

Courts also should consider the possibility that a defendant’s resources
may be exhausted, leaving injured claimants without an adequate recovery
because of the potential for so many individuals to become claimants.182 This
risk is especially problematic given the questionable health benefits of medical
monitoring and the fact that many claimants already receive monitoring funds
through insurance coverage.
Additional criteria that should be considered were set forth in the diet drug
litigation for use in evaluating the fairness of a class action settlement that
established a complicated compensation and medical screening program.183
There, the judge found the medical monitoring scheme was fair because it met
each of the following criteria, namely whether: (1) the disease in question
progresses asymptomatically following toxic exposure; (2) a diagnostic test
with high sensitivity exists; (3) the exposed population has a relatively high
prevalence of disease; (4) the diagnostic test therefore has a high predictive
value; (5) the test is relatively low-cost; (6) medical monitoring could be
integrated into standard clinical follow-up of those with disease; (7)
monitoring could lead to early preventive care; and (8) monitoring allows for
the appropriate timing of definitive treatment.184 The Journal of the American

177. See Beeler & Sappenfield, 87 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY at 285 (“[T]he event itself
must be serious enough, if untreated, to justify the treatment.”).
178. See Abraham, supra note 16, at 1979 (advocating for “something like a reasonableexpenditure standard” to ensure that the benefits of monitoring are worth their costs).
179. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way, supra note 105, at 355 (quoting
David M. Studdert et al., Medical Monitoring for Pharmaceutical Injuries: Tort Law for the
Public’s Health?, JAMA, Feb. 19, 2003, at 889, 893–94 [ hereinafter Studdert et al.]).
180. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
181. Id. at 980.
182. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
183. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000), reh’g denied, 2000 WL 1599259
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000).
184. See id. at *54.
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Medical Association found these stringent criteria to be “consonant with sound
epidemiological principles and the best available scientific knowledge of the
disease at issue. They also resonate with health policy recommendations for
the adoption of cost-effective disease prevention strategies.”185
D. Legislative Response Possibly Needed
Whether Meyer will produce substantial negative impacts may depend
upon how the Missouri Supreme Court’s vague ruling is implemented. By
refusing “to establish precisely what must be proven in order to recover
medical monitoring damages”186 the Missouri Supreme Court gave subsequent
courts flexibility to develop sound and fair guidelines, such as those described
above, to avoid extreme and unsound consequences. If Missouri courts do not
accept this invitation, however, and problems emerge—such as those described
by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley, and like those that occurred in
West Virginia and Louisiana following the adoption of medical monitoring in
those states—then a legislative response may be appropriate. The Missouri
legislature may wish to consider the approach taken by the Louisiana
legislature and restrict medical monitoring awards to claims “directly related to
a manifest physical or mental injury or disease.”187
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the Missouri Supreme Court has been highly respected for
reaching fair and sound tort law decisions. The Missouri Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Meyer, however, represents a dramatic departure from that
tradition. The court held that plaintiffs with no present physical injury may
recover medical monitoring as an item of compensable damages when liability
is established under traditional tort law theories of recovery. The opinion is
inconsistent with decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the five
consecutive state courts of last resort that had recently considered—and
rejected—medical monitoring claims by pre-injury plaintiffs. Remarkably,
none of the serious policy concerns raised by those influential courts were even
discussed in the Meyer opinion.
Meyer is a weak opinion and should be viewed as an anomaly given the
recent strong trend in other states. Consequently, the opinion’s influence
outside of Missouri should be limited. Even within Missouri, the opinion’s
influence will depend largely on how subsequent courts fill in the many gaps
left by the Meyer court’s vague directive. If Missouri courts do not accept this

185. Studdert et al., supra note 179, at 893.
186. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 718 n.7 (Mo. 2007).
187. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2007).
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opportunity to restore sound policy to Missouri medical monitoring law, the
legislature would be wise to consider a statutory fix.
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